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Abstract
In Indonesian national system of education, Islamic religious education is
compulsory for all levels of formal education. Taking into account such a
position, Islamic religious education is potentially strategic in responding to
some of the main issues in religious life. One issue examined in this paper is
radicalism that continues to overshadow the dynamics of religious life in In-
donesia. Although numerous attempts (mainly security approach) to eradi-
cate radicalism have been taken, radicalism is still a prominent problem in
Indonesia. This paper argues that Islamic religious education should be em-
powered in order to reduce the spread of radicalism. In order to bring these
ideas into reality, this paper further offers Living Values E education (LVE) as
a theoretical framework to develop Islamic religious education which is com-
patible with this goal.
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Pendidikan agama Islam dalam sistem pendidikan nasional di Indonesia
merupakan salah satu materi yang wajib diajarkan dalam institusi pendidikan
formal mulai dari jenjang pendidikan dasar sampai ke jenjang pendidikan tinggi.
Dengan mempertimbangkan posisinya yang demikian, pendidikan agama Is-
lam memiliki potensi strategis untuk merespons beberapa persoalan utamanya
dalam kehidupan agama. Salah satu persoalan yang hendak dikaji dalam tulisan
ini adalah radikalisme yang terus membayangi kehidupan umat beragama di
Indonesia. Meskipun telah dirancang berbagai upaya untuk membendung
radikalisme terutama dengan menggunakan pendekatan keamanan, radikalisme
ternyata masih eksis di Indonesia. Tulisan ini menawarkan pendidikan agama
Islam sebagai salah satu institusi pendidikan yang perlu diberdayakan untuk
membendung arus radikalisme. Untuk mewujudkan pemikiran tersebut,
tulisan ini selanjutnya menawarkan living values education (LVE) sebagai suatu
kerangka  teoritik untuk mengembangkan pendidikan agama Islam.
Keywords: Islamic religious education; Living values education; De-
radicalization
Introduction
Over the last two decades, religious life in Indonesia has been marked by
a variety of dramatic changes. The most striking one took place within
Islamic communities. As Islam is a religion of more than 80% of the total
Indonesia’s population, any changes occuredwithin Islamic
communitiescan easily be noticed and analysed by academics comitted in
conducting in-depth studies on the subject. One of the changes that at-
tracted attention of researchers is the growing militancy of some Muslim
groups which harbour an aspiration of making IndonesianIslam more
authentic. During more than a century, in fact, there have been numer-
ous Islamic movements that have significantly contributed both to the
development of Islam itself and in the context of nationhood and state-
hood life. Muhammadiyah (established in 1912) and Nahdlatul Ulama or
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NU (established in 1926) are two major Islamic movements in Indonesia
widely known not only for their ability to survive in a long span of time
(more than a century), but also for their success in establishing a variety
of social institutions which bring positive impacts not only for Muslims,
but also for for Indonesian citizens, in general. However, since the col-
lapse of the New Order regime, new Islamic religious groups emerged
within Muslim society in the country. These groups, according to a num-
ber of studies, have  more militant stance in struggling for an agenda and
ideology which have never been stated explicitly both by Muhammadiyah
and NU. Unlike Muhammadiyah and NU, these new Islamic religious
groups openly campaign for, and even design a movement for the cre-
ation of a state ruled by religious principleswhich is popularly known as
Islamic state. In their view, an Islamic state is seen as a guarantee for a
thorough enforcement of Islamic law.1 Among many expressions which
militant Islamic groups frequently roar in public sphere is the strong aspi-
ration of establishing  a religious state, or a state which is able to accom-
modate shari’a-based regulations. Inevitably, this is a field of study which
attracts attention of scholars both domestic and abroad. For example,
Greg Fealy and Sally White of the Australian National University (ANU),
Canberra, Australia, published a book entitled Islam: Religious Life and
Politics in Indonesia.2This book is an edited volume of papers presented at
1Hizb ut- Tahrir Indonesia ( HTI ) , one of the Islamic movement called MC Ricklefs as
political parties move beyond the electoral system ( the electoral system) , even called the
caliphate as bentul ideal Islamic state , including in Indonesia . See M.C. Ricklefs , “Religious
Elites and the State in Indonesia and Elsewhere : Take- Overs Why Are So Difficult and
Usually Do not Work “ , in Hui Yew - Foong ( ed . ) , Encountering Islam : The Politics of
Religious Identities in Southeast Asia,  Singapore : ISEAS , 2013  , 34-35 . See also Ainur
Rofiq al Amin, Membongkar Proyek Khilafah Ala Hizbut Tahrir di Indonesia, Yogyakarta:
LKIS,  2012.
2Greg Fealy and Sally White (ed. ) , Expressing Islam : Religious Life and Politics in Indone-
sia, Singapore : ISEAS 2008 , 7. See also Winfried Weck , Noorhaidi Hasan and Irfan
Abubakar (ed), Islam in the Public Sphere, Jakarta : CSRC , 2011; Noorhaidi Hasan, The
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the Conference of 25th Indonesia Update conducted on 7-8September
2007at ANU.
In the above-mentioned volume, Fealy and White discussed the phe-
nomenon. They maintain:
“…the growth in the number of Islamist parties and organisations,
the implementation of sharia-based bylaws at the provincial and dis-
trict level, and the introduction of more restrictive regulations on
womens’ movements and dress are cited as proof of iliberal trends
within the Muslim community.”3
The increasing boldness of Islamic militant groups in expressing their
stance in the public space, primarily in the political sphere, is not without
reason. Study conducted by Centre for Islam and Society (PPIM), Syarif
Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta revealed  two important
factors. Firstly, the process of modernization has culminated in the crisis
phase. It is characterized by the materialization of life, marginalization of
spirituality, and the prominence of the values   of rationality. On the
other hand, as the second factor, the New Order authoritarian power
has come to its end. This  collapse has, in turn, paved the way for the
process of decentralization and democratization,4which also opened up
more free space for the emergence of various religious groups led by Is-
lamic community.5The combination of these two factors has prompted
massive emergence of new religious groups in Indonesia. In such a con-
text, militant Islamic groups’ claim of offering an alternativefor
Making of Public Piety Islam , Democracy and Youth in Indonesian Politics, Yogyakarta: SUKA
Press,2013.
3Greg Fealy and Sally White (ed. ) , Expressing…, 7.
4Andy Fuller, “Reading Ahmadiyah and Discourse on Freedom of Religion in Indone-
sia”, dalam Bernhard Platzdasch and Johan Saravanamuttu (ed.), Religious Diversity in
Muslim-majority States in Souteast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS,  2014, 75.
5Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia,
Jakarta: Teraju, 2002, 3.
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Indonesiato solve its multidimensional crisis can be situated.6 It is impor-
tant to note that some religious groups maintain network with other
groups which are known with similar names abroad. This phenomenon
is better called transnational Islamic movements as represented by the
case of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia. Some other group, however, utilize do-
mestic network, rather than transnational one. They are often referred
to as home-grown religious groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front
(FPI), Laskar Jihad (LJ) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI).
The presence of these religious groups has inevitably sparked public at-
tention. This is mainlydue to a series of their actions which differ from
mainstream Islamic groups’position.7 They, for example,often march along
the streets demanding the implementation of Islamic law.HTI is known
for its jargon: “Save Indonesia with shari’a.”
Although scattered in various names and groups, these new religious
groupsare actually located in the same ideological frame. M. Syafii Anwar
offers the concept of militant Salafi Movement as a conceptualization to
these developments. Anwar puts emphasis on militant characters inher-
ent in the groups ranging from domain of religious understanding to the
movement that is fundamentally implicated in various aspects of social life.8
6Jajang Jahroni dan  Jamhari (ed.), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, Jakarta: Rajawali
Pers, 2004, 13. See also, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Masa Depan Islam di Indonesia,” dalam
Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indone-
sia, Jakarta: Gerakan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, The Wahid Institute, and Maarif Institute, 2009,8
7Differences in outlook and action between Muhammadiyah and NU issues related to
Islamic law discussed by Gordon P. Means. Instead of supporting agenda sharia formaliza-
tion of new denominations of Islam, Muhammadiyah and NU, instead choosing a more
substantive application of the scheme. Formalization of sharia according to Abdul Mukti,
the young leaders of Muhammadiyah, it dries the ethical and humanitarian dimension of
Islam . See Gordon P. Means, Political Islam in Souteast Asia, London: Lynne Rienner
Publisher, 2009, 311.
8M. Syafii Anwar, Memetakan Teologi Politik dan Anatomi Gerakan Salafi Militan di Indone-
sia, dalam in M. Zaki Mubarak, Genealogi Islam Radikal di Indonesia: Gerakan, Pemikiran dan
Prospek Demokrasi, Jakarta: LP3ES, 2007, xiii.
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Meanwhile, Martin van Bruinessen uses the concept of conservatism to
capture the same phenomenon. This concept is used by Bruinessen to
explain the changing face of Islam, from tolerant and compromising in-
clination to more hardened tendency as indicated by a series of conflicts
and violence in some parts of Indonesia. Furthermore, Bruinessen also
unveils the next phenomena that serve as evidentiary material which
strengthen the leaning of conservatism in Indonesian Islam. Among the
phenomenon is the over-reaction of Muslim public in general to liberal-
ism following the publication of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI)
fatwa which bans secularism, pluralism, and liberalism.9 This fatwa, ac-
cording to Bruinessen, has in turn fostered intolerance against religious
minorities in Islamic circles as experienced by Ahmadiyya and Shia. Based
on this situation, Bruinessen asserts that Islam in Indonesia is facing a
turn towards conservatism. Both Anwar’s and Bruinessen’s categories
are basically in line with the concept of fundamentalism  which is also
often used to describe  the existence of religious groups that subscribe to
literal and scriptural understanding of the normative religious texts (the
Quran and Sunna). Fundamentalism thus have integralistic understand-
ing of Islam in the sense that Islam as a revelation of God brought by the
prophets from the Prophet Adam to Prophet Muhammad is a complete
and perfect religion or doctrine which regulates all human life. 10 How-
ever, it should be noted from the outset that the use term or idea of
“fundamentalism”and”religious movements” in the post-New Order In-
donesian context  is is too loose. This situation closely relatesto the fact
that there are many among Islam both individuals and groups that can
9Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Concervative Turn: Islam Indonesia dalam Ancaman
Fundamentalisme, Bandung: Mizan, 2014, 24-49.
10Haidar Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia, Jakarta:
PSAP, 2007, 23-24.
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be classified as “fundamentalist” because of his belief in the truthof fun-
damental aspects of Islam, such as the Quran and Sunna. As an alterna-
tive to fundamentalism, Olivier Roy employs the term radicalism in the
sense of a movement attempting at thinking of Islam as a political ideol-
ogy with the entire social order in public life returned into the paradigm
of absoluteness and the totality of God’s power.11 Based on this analysis, it
can be affirmed that religious radicalism has featured the development
of religious life in the country post-New Order period. This development
is important as radicalism has potential to transform into a religious
movement which possibly brings destructive impacts on society. More-
over, there is also a neutral view on radicalism stating that fundamental-
ism is not really a threat as long as the idea of radicalism never been
turned into real radical actions.12 But, since each religious movement has
the potential to be transformed into reality especially if there are sup-
porting factors, the development of radicalism should not be seen as a
simple and neutral religious phenomenon.
Transformation of the most alarming radicalism is that it can evolve
into terrorism, in the form of use of force (the deliberate use of violence)
wrapped in religious language but mainly at the expense of “civil society”
innocencece (against innocent people) as the target in order to achieve
their main targets, which is political.13 This transformation has occurred
in Indonesia since the beginning of2000s. This transformation, accord-
ing to the study of The SETARA Institute, is the third phase of transfor-
mation in the history of the Islamic movement in Indonesia. The SETARA
11Oliver Roy, Genealogi Islam Radikal, Yogyakarta: Genta Press, 2005, 25-26.
12Endang Turmudi dan Riza Sihbudi (ed.), Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia, Jakarta:
LIPI Press, 2005, 5.
13As noted by Karen Armstrong, the main target of terrorism is a political movement
both in terms of gain or maintain. See Karen Armstrong, Fields of Blood: Religion and the
History of Violence, London: The Bodley Head, 2014, 313.
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Institute identifies this phase as the most important phase for taking
terrorism as a mode of struggle.14 Actions and impact caused by the ter-
rorist movement cannot be easily erased from the collective memory of
the Indonesian people. This is reasonable as for a decade since the begin-
ning of 2000, terrorism has been frequent feature of social life in Indo-
nesia which has killeda considerable number of civilians coupled with
material losses such as the destruction of property. Practically, those who
are killed by the terrorist attacked, in the most cases, are not the real and
main target. Victims are often chosen randomly (targets of opportunity)
or selected (representative or symbolic targets). Therefore, the victims
could be randomly fromdiverse social groups and background.. As in the
case of the destruction of the WTC on September 11, 2001, the terrorist
pointed to a selected target (representative or symbolic targets), in this
case, its main target is the United States as a political entity. The Bali
bombing displayed the similar case. Bali, as an icon of tourism in Indone-
sia and visited by considerably number of foreigners especially from Aus-
tralia, a country which is perceived as part of the imperialist network
which oppress Islamic countries, is selected as the  target of terorrism act
(targets of opportunity) , Nevertheless, the impacts brought by the attack
are not only material damage, but also immaterial damage and pressure
(psychological). The same situation can also be seen from the case of post-
14The first phase of the Islamic movement was marked by the strengthening of the spirit
of nationalism. Islamic figures more organized form associations as an instrument to arouse
nationalist movement so that the Indonesian nation to be a nation that is free from colo-
nialism. One of the copies of the Islamic movement in the first phase is the SI . In the second
phase, the Islamic movement is marked by the strengthening of the cultural Islamic move-
ment after the New Order regime was less accommodating to Muslim aspirations. In this
phase appears many progressive Islamic thinkers such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman
Wahid, Munawir Sjadzali, Djohan Effendi, M. Dawam Rahardjo, Moelim Abdurrahman,
Kuntowijoyo more affirm cultural Islam. See Ismail Hasani and Bonar Tigor Naipospos(ed.),
Dari Radikalisme Menuju Terorisme: Studi Relasi dan Transformasi Organisasi Islam Radikal di
Jawa Tengah & D.I. Yogyakarta, Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, 2012, 9-12.
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detonation WTC and the Pentagon which has caused  tremendous im-
pacts politically, psychologically,15 and shaked the world economy as well
as increase the tension between America (West) with the Islamic world.16
In short, radicalization only led to loss, fear, threat, and damage; and this
is incompatible with the substantive message of Islam as the giver of grace
(well-being, tranquility, happiness, or preservation) of all mankind.
Although the security forces have detained some of the perpetrators
of terrorism, but as it is said Ansyaad Mbai and Dawn Purwawidada,
terrorism as difficult to eradicate. Even more seriously, new actors whith
international networks emerged. Recent investigations managed to iden-
tified hundreds of Indonesian citizens who join the Islamic State(IS) and
Nusro in Iraq and Syria have just been conducted. This developmentis
an important indication that since the Bali bombing in 2001, the threat
of terrorism, as predicted by Noor Huda Ismail,17 has not vanished.
Stem the flow of radicalism
Tracing the nature of of radicalism and terrorism is not an easy task,
especially in a period when our world is marked by advanced inventionsin
science and technology.This has resulted inunprecedented situation of
the world whichis called by Thomas L. Friedmanas “the world is flat.”18In
this “flat world, or in the classic concept of Marshall McLuhan called
the”Global Village,”the exchange of ideas can quickly take place.
1511 September 2001 gave rise to the psychological effects such as fear, panic, anger and
traumatic not only felt by American citizens but also the world’s people globally. More
details see Yasraf Amir Piliang, Hiperterorisme dan Hiperteknologi, in  Farid Muttaqin &
Sukardi (Edit.), Teroris Serang Islam: Babak Baru Benturan Barat-Islam, Bandung: Pustaka
Hidayah, 2001, 63.
16M. Abzar D., Teologi Teroris: Konstruksi ...., 1.
17Noor Huda Ismail, “Islam Nusantara di tengah Radikalisme”, Tempo, 26 Juli 2015,
38-39.
18See Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat, England, Penguin Books: 2006.
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A study conducted by Peter Mandaville on the development of
transnational Islamic movements in South Asia and Southeast Asia, un-
derlines the impacts of new information technology. Inevitably, it is one
of the main factors which trigger the penetration of religious understand-
ing and movements to a region. Three other major factors are:  the
exchange of scholarship and study, labor migration, and the obligation
to perform the pilgrimage.19 Of the four main factors, the influence of
new media is the most notable. Long before the booming of new media
in this era, in 1999 John Naisbitt published a book titled, High Tech-High
Touch: Technology and Our Search for Meaning,20 as a reminderof the emer-
gence of a phenomenon which can be said as “drunk zone technology.”
This phenonemon is characterized by abundant devotion to technology,
although some use for leisure. Facebook, a new media founded by Mark
Zuckerberg, is a good example of this wave. Facebook is fantastic, as the
number of its users continue to grow from year to year, of which Indone-
sia is the fourth largest Facebook users globally.21 The influence of infor-
mation technology has created a variety of new media, according to Ariel
Heryanto, cannot be taken lightly, as it has proved its ability to intervene
and its capability to reshape social life of mankind throughout the
world.The social life in Indonesia, is not an exception of this new wave.22
In relation to religious life, public access toa variety of reading
materialswhich contain elements of radicalism available on many web-
19Peter Mandeville, “Transnational Islam in Asia: Background, Typology and Concep-
tual Overview”, in Peter Mandeville et al, Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia:
Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics, Washington: The National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2009, 13.
20In 2001, this book has been translated and published by Mizan  by title, High Tech-
High Touch: Pencarian Makna di Tengah Perkembangan Pesat Teknologi.
21http://techno.okezone.com/read/2014/09/22/55/1042737/indonesia-pengguna-
facebook-keempat-terbesar-di-dunia.
22Ariel Haryanto, Identitas dan Kenikmatan: Politik Budaya Layar Indonesia, Jakarta:
Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2015, 13.
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pages, have possiblyled a person to experiencing radical reasoning. As
Muhammad Najib Azca uncovers in his After Jihad: A Biographical Ap-
proach to Passionate Politics in Indonesia, the involvement of cognition and
emotionin information and events presented in can, in turn, attract
people —especially those who are experiencing an identity crisis and the
problems of life— into real radicalism activities, and even terrorism.23In
this context, it isunderstandablethat in 2015 Indonesian government
banned a number of websites thatcontain radical understanding of Islam
andare regarded as the driving force for radicalism in the country.24
This policy was then aroused controversy. Nevertheless, regardless the
controversy, it should be taken into account that this closure can be viewed
as a precaution against the spread of radical understanding. Agus Surya
Bakti maintains that vulnerable groups are easily infiltrated by terrorist
ideology. In terms of age, the group indicated vulnerable to terrorist ide-
ology are teenagers or young people who have a lot of free time to internet
browsing, while on the one hand they are immature from various as-
pects, especially psychologically, intellectually, economically, and socially.
Azca’s studies specializing in youth radicalization reinforces this view. Ac-
cording toAzca, young people are vulnerableof being radicalized and may
be further involved in radical movement of terrorists as they are in a
transition phase in the growth of the age that allows them to experience
an identity crisis. These conditions have inevitably facilitated the open-
ing up of their cognition, which constitutes a micro-biological processes
that bring them to the acceptance of new more radical ideas and under-
standing in the field of religion.25
23Muhammad Najib Azca, “After Jihad: A Biographical Approach toPassionate Politics in
Indonesia” Ph.D Thesis, Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research [AISSR], 2011, 90.
24http://internetsehat.id/2015/04/inilah-daftar-22-situs-islam-yang-diblokir-
menkominfo/
25Muhammad Najib Azca, “Yang Muda, Yang Radikal: Refleksi Sosiologis Terhadap Radikalisme
Kaum Muda di Indonesia Pasca-Orde Baru,” Maarif, Vol. 8, No.1 (Juli 2013),19-20.
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The contribution of socio-political context is important in paving the
way for youth’s involvement in radical movements. Azca calls this phenom-
enon as schism genesis, which is drastic changes occur in a political transi-
tion towards democracy.26 A combination of these vulnerability variables
could bring negative impactson the formation of their perspectives on reli-
gion obtained from various internet sources containing radical
understandingwhich are usually shallow, using black and white approach,
and spread hatred against other parties who subscribe to other views.27
However, young people are not the only vulnerable groups of being radi-
cals. In addition to individuals, the potential emergence of radicalism also
found in some areas of the country vulnerable for conflicts caused by the
grouping formed by various identities such as ethnicity, religion, econom-
ics, and politics. In accordance with this variable, riots in Tolikara, Papua,
on July 17, 2015, can be perceived as a strong signal that attitudes and
actions of radicals using a mode of violence can arise when intergroup rela-
tion within a society cannot be managed properly. This can also be an impor-
tant indication that radicalism can be perpetrated bynot only particular reli-
gious group, only Islam for example, but also by other religious groups.
Aware of the “immortality nature” of radicalism and terrorism in In-
donesia, efforts to eradicate it has been taken by many. It should be noted
that security and militaristic approach are not effective ways to combat
terrorism as it does not operate on the level of mind.As Agus Surya Bakti
asserts: “The bullet is only able to penetrate the body, but are not able to pen-
etrate the hearts and minds of radical-terrorists.”28 In order to enrich the secu-
rity approach and to prevent the breeding, development and dissemina-
tion of radical Islam, a softer approach of de-radicalization should be in-
26Muhammad Najib Azca, “Yang Muda…, 19-20.
27Agus SB., Darurat Terorisme: Kebijakan Pencegahan, Perlindungan dan Deradikalisasi,
Jakarta: Daulat Press, 2014, 170-172.
28Agus SB., Darurat Terorisme…, 173.
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troduced. By this approach, not only those who have been involved in
radical-terrorist actions are targeted, but also general public.This is meant
as a strategy to prevent and at the same time as an early warning system
against radicalism and terrorism. Thus, de-radicalization has a diverse
meaning. One definition says that de-radicalization is an attempt to neu-
tralize radical understanding of those who involved in acts of terrorism
and the sympathizers.29 This definition limits the de-radicalization only
for those who involved in the radical movements. Other than this defi-
nition, a broader definition and more relevant to this paper put forward
by SETARA Institute.This definition formulates de-radicalization as early
detection measures. In terms of target, SETARA Institute’s definition
extends the subjects of de-radicalization to a wide range of potential layer
with different forms and variants respectively. In this context, the  con-
cept of Islam Nusantara (Nusantara Islam) is worth considering. Accord-
ing to Noor Huda Ismail, Nusantara Islam is expected to be key for the
success of de-radicalization.30 From discussions at various forums, it is re-
vealed that Islam Nusantarais apparently intended as an anti-thesis to radical
understanding of Islam which became a justification for acts of violence
including those using terrorism as a strategy.31 "Broadly speaking, Islam
Nusantara will not teach someone to be radical. It will not teach enmity and
hatred. In contrast, Islam teaches friendliness and can go hand in hand with the
culture of civilization in Indonesia which is very polite,”explained Said Aqil Siraj.32
The terminology of Nusantara Islam is actually not something new in
academic studies, especially in the perspective of archeology and history.33
29Asia Report No. 142, 19 November 2007, 1.
30Ismail Hasani dan Bonar Tigor Naipospos, Dari Radikalisme…, 191.
31Noor Huda Ismail, “Islam Nusantara…”, 38-39.
32Bangga Islam Nusantara Mendunia” (http://www.jpnn.com/read/2015/07/13/
314878/Bangga-Islam-Nusantara)
33See Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Global dan Lokal Islam Nusantara, Bandung:  Jakarta, 2002,
and Uka Tjandrasasmita, Arkeologi Islam Nusantara, Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia,
2009.
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Through the study of Islam Nusantara with both perspectives, it can be
obtained strong evidence for the acculturation process between Islam as
a religion, on the one hand, with various local traditions that stretch
from Sabang to Merauke, on the other. This shows that Islam is a reli-
gion which has grounded its value among the people of the archipelago,
while radicalism intends to uproot Islam from the roots of its history in
the archipelago; or in the words of Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo,
radicalism offers and creates an Islamic identity that is generic or de-
culturated.34
The strategic position of Islamic education
Considering potential threat of radicalism, the idea of Nusantara   Islam
should be appreciated. However, the idea of Islam Nusantara will only
detter at the level of discourse if it is not followed by strengthening the
various social institutions which have long been owned by Muslim com-
munities. One type of social institutions need to be strengthened and
empowered in the context of eradicating radicalism is the educational
institution. It should be restated here that education is an institution
with strategic position in shaping and developing attitudes based on the
views and values of certain. As an institution designed to fortify the pen-
etration of radicalism, educational institutions should have a view and
specific values that can be utilised to resist the logic of radicalism. Educa-
tional institutions which is seen as having a close linkage to stemming
the radicalization agenda (de-radicalization) is Islamic religious education
course.
What is an Islamic education, then? This question is intentionally raised
due to a tendency among public and scholars to confuse Islamic religious
34Greg Fealy dan Anthony Bubalo, Jejak Kafilah: Pengaruh Radikalisme Timur Tengah di
Indonesia, Bandung,: Mizan, 2007, 104.
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education with Islamic education. For example, learning or subjects of
the Islamic religion in schools are sometimes referred to as “Islamic edu-
cation” when more appropriate term should be is “Islamic religious edu-
cation.”35 The confusion on the semantic level is not independent of the
various discourses and practices that are contrary to the education and
development of Islam. At least two variants of education in Islamic circles
that are often confused, namely:36
1. Education in Islam or Islamic education, namely education conceived
and developed from the teachings and fundamental values   contained in
the two fundamental source of Islamic teachings, the Quran and Sunna.
In the first sense, Islamic education can be either educational thought or
theory which bases itself on or is developed from thesefundamental sources.
2. Islamic education is an attempt to teachand practice Islamic principles
and valueswhich will further be part of a person’s attitude and conducts.
In this second sense of Islamic education can be formulated as: a) All
activities carried out by someone or a particular institution to help a
person or a group of learners in developing the teachings of Islam and its
values; b) All phenomena or events of the encounter between two or
more persons whose impact is embedded and/or growth of Islamic teach-
ings and values   on one or several parties.
Moving to further discussion, in this section should be mentioned the
Indonesian Government Regulation No. 55 Year 2007 on Education of
Religion and Religious Education. At this rule, there are, at least, two
nomenclatures can be used to clarify the Islamic education and Islamic
education institutions. The First nomenclature is religious education which
35Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Nalar Spiritual Pendidikan: Solusi Problem Filosofis Pendidikan
Islam, Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2002, 55.
36Muhaimin, dkk., Paradigma Pendidikan Islam ..., 29-30; see also in Sukarji & Umiarso,
Manajemen dalam Pendidikan Islam: Konstruksi Teoritis-Filosofis dalam Menemukan
Kebermaknaan Pengelolaan Pendidikan Islam, Jakarta: Mitra Wacana Media, 2014, 6.
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is defined as education which provides knowledge and shaping attitudes,
personality, and skills of students in the practice of their religion, which
is carried out at least through the subjects/courses at all sweet, levels and
types of education.37 Under this rule, religious education is understood as
an institution that provides education to prepare studentsto play a role
which requires a mastery ofreligious knowledge and practice the teach-
ings of his religion.38 With reference to the government regulations, an
Islamic religious education in this paper uses the definition of the first
nomenclature. Islamic religious education as such “limited” teaching
materials in formal education given in primary education to higher edu-
cation. While the Islamic educational institution is understood as reli-
gious education institution such as madrasas and boarding schools de-
signed to prepare students who have expertise in the field of religious
sciences.
Although it is limited as teaching materials and not designed as a spe-
cial training for those who intend to pursue expertise in the fields of
religion, Islamic education still play specific role. Therefore, it should
also be able to play a strategic role in eradicating radicalism. Theoreti-
cally speaking, the embodiment towards these roles should have been
easy to do considering the strong position that Islamic religious educa-
tion assume in the context of national education system in Indonesia. As
a continuation of ideological stance that Indonesia is a country based on
the principle of One Godhead, government’s policy in education gives
adequate space to the existence of religious education, including Islamic
religious education. This is in contrast to countries that adhere to the
principle of secularism which defines the clear demarcation between reli-
37Indonesian Government Regulation Number  55 Year 2007 on  Religious Education
and Religious Educationin ChapterI (General Provisions) of paragraph(1).
38Indonesian Government Regulation No. 55 Year2007 on Religious Education and
Religious Education in ChapterI (General Provisions) of paragraph(2).
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gion as a personal area (private sphere) and politics in the public,39 while
in Indonesia religions are given a strategic position in the public sphere
through a policy of religious education as a compulsory subject in pri-
mary education since up to higher education. This policy is long overdue.
After five years declared itself as an independent and sovereign nation,
Indonesia made the arrangement of the system of education in schools
through the issuance of Law No. 1950 on Education in schools.40These
laws that regulate what is referred to in Chapter XII with “the teaching
of religion inpublic schools.” Article 20 contained the following provi-
sions:
1. In public schools religious classes are conducted; parents determine
whether their children will follow the lesson.
2. The methods of religious classes teaching in public schools is determined
in the rules which are set by the Ministry of Education and Culture, in
cooperation with the Minister of Religious Affairs.41
By the passing of time, the mandate of religious education is increas-
ingly strengthened. In 2003, the government passed the Law of the Re-
public of Indonesia Number 20 Year 2003 on National Education Sys-
tem, which comtains a provision concerning religious education. This
law states that religious education is one of compulsary subjects in all
educational levels.42 The provision of Islamic religious education does
not stop at providing legal protection in the form of legislation. Further-
more, as cited in the previous paragraph, the government has had a more
detailed legal framework to regulate implementation of Islamic religious
education. On Article 3, paragraph (1) Regulation No. 55 of 2007 con-
39H.A.R. Tilaar, Manifesto Pendidikan Nasional, Jakarta: Kompas, 2005, 230.
40H.A.R. Tilaar, Pembangunan Pendidikan Nasional 1945-1995, Jakarta: Grasindo, 1995,
xxx.
41Dikutip dari H.A.R. Tilaar, Pembangunan Pendidikan…, 661.
42See ChapterX, Article 37.
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tained the following provisions: “Every educational unit on all lines, levels,
and types of educations hall hold religious education.” Then in Article 7para-
graph(1) there is a provision:”Unit of education which organizes religious
education is not in accordance with the provisions referred to in Article 3 para-
graph(1) Article 4 paragraph(2) to paragraph (7), and Article5, paragraph(1)
shall be subject to administrative sanctions in the form of a warning until after
the closing was held coaching/mentoring by the Government and/or local gov-
ernment.” Several articles in the regulation are indications of the strength-
ened position of Islamic religious education as a compulsary subject at all
levels of formal education.
Upon consideration of such a position, Islamic religious education can
be included as part of a scheme de-radicalization from religion point of
view. By including into this scheme, Islamic religious education should
also be understood as an activity gives a more moderate understanding of
various key concepts in Islamic radicalism in perspective and attitude would
lead to violence. Nasaruddin Umar43 gives an example of Surah Tawbah
of the Quran, verse 5 as one of the verses that contains qital but often
misunderstood by both Muslim and non-Muslims. Translation of this verse
as follows:
“But when the forbidden months, then slay the idolaters wherever
you find them, and capture them. Besiege them and spy on them in
the reconnaissance. If they repent and establish worship and practice
regular charity, then give them the freedom to walk. Allah is Forgiv-
ing, Merciful.”
Without understanding the historical context (asbab al nuzul), the verse
could lead to the view that Islam justifies the use of violent and destruc-
tive way towards others or different religions. More profoundly, Umar
43Nasaruddin Umar, Deradikalisasi Pemahaman al-Qur’an & Hadist, Jakarta: Qanita,
2014, 4.
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identifies eight Islamic concepts that need to be reinterpreted in modera-
tion, namely: jihad, qital, apostasy, scribes, kafir dzimmi, kafir harbi, darus
salam, and darul harbi. By the de-radicalization, says Umar, it is not in-
tended to negate the key concepts; or meant to be an effort to silting
faith, but rather as an effort to restore and realign against Islam as a
religion of grace, peace, tolerance, respect for human rights, and
emancipatory.44 In contrast, radical Islam put more emphasis on textual
readings in the sense of “... ignores or rejects the socio-historical context of the
Quran in interpretation.”45 By understanding textually, the meaning of a
text in the Quran is understood as a fixed formula, which closes any pos-
sibility of “change” or other meaning. The interpretation of text is re-
garded as universally applicable in any contexts. More fundamentally, a
radical will not look at the dynamics of historical sociological circumstances
surrounding the text. Syarif Hidayatullah gives an interesting explanation:46
“... A pattern of understanding and diversity of the” radical religion
“always refers to the Quran, due to their readings that are too narrow
and normative. They just made the Quran as the readings are taken
for granted, which received direct and candid, do not need to be ac-
companied critical and historical readings. It would be very dangerous
because they keep a distance from social reality. As if there is an as-
sumption: “the important run” command “of the Quran, they can be
said to have committed” virtue “and will get a reward with their Lord.”
This is where the problem of violent behavior in the name of reli-
gion.”
In the same context, Abdullah Saeed gives an example of the mean-
ing of the text relating to the law of apostasy. When it is understood
44Nasaruddin Umar, Deradikalisasi…, 342-384.
45Abdullah Saeed, Interpreting the Qur’an: Toward a ContemporaryApproach, London:
Roudledge, 2006, 50.
46Syarif Hidayatullah, Islam “Isme-Isme”: Aliran dan Paham Islam di Indonesia, Yogyakarta:
Pustaka Pelajar, 2010, 93.
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textually, the argument in the form of hadith which reads, “man baddala
dinahu faqtuluhu” (which can be textually be seen as order to kill whoever
converts), Then it will lead to legal consequences in the form of execu-
tion against apostate. In this case, Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed
argue that although apostasy is still regarded as a sin, the punishment
cannot be applied because it is contrary to the basic principles of Islam
that recognizes the diversity of religion and the prohibition of conver-
sion by force. “Islam is not a religion bent on persecuting all Reviews those who
do not believe in it, or who leave it for one reason or another. Recognizes diversity
Islam or religion, even though it does not approve of religious forms that it per-
ceives have been derived from non-divine sources,” said Abdullah Saeed and
Hassan Saeed.47 Then he continued: “Islam regards life as testing ground,
one of the most important aspects of which freedom to choose a belief system and
a way of life.”48
To avoid textual understanding, Abdullah Saeed stressed the impor-
tance of contextual understanding by considering the socio-historical con-
text at the time the text was revealed: “... I refer to as contextualist empha-
size the socio-historical context of the ethico-legal the content of the Quran and its
subsequent Interpretations,”Saeed explains.49 It can be asserted that Saeed
basically affirms the view of thought Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988) Paki-
stani Muslim.50 Contextual reading of the text as developed by Fazlur
47Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam, England:
Ashgate,  2004, 86.
48Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion…, 86.
49Abdullah Saeed, Interpreting the Quran ..., 3.
50Once settled in Chicago as professor of Islamic studies at the University of Chicago,
Fazlur Rahman develop contextual understanding that way actually initiated while still in
Pakistan, the methodology calls with a double movement as a combination of inductive and
deductive thinking. With a double movement, Fazlur Rahman offers an understanding of
the al-Quran by taking two steps: First, understand the meaning of the statement of the
Quran, by examining historical situations or problems where the answer and response to al-
Quran emerged. The second step of this first movement is a generalized statement of the
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Rahman and Abdullah Saeed will be rejected by radical Muslims. A con-
textual reading will provide opportunities to use human reasoning that
tend to be critical and will instead be able to distort the real meaning of
a text. Therefore, for them, the text of the Quran must be understood
literally-as it is, since reason is deemed unable to provide the proper in-
terpretation of the text. Radical believe that although certain parts of
the scripture may seem to contradict one another, reason is not justified
to some sort of compromise and interpreting these verses.51 Because Is-
lamic religious education can be ensured in contact with some of the key
concepts such as jihad that underlie radicalism should be given broad
meaning by linking between text and context dialectically. Ali Ashghar
Engineer analyzed:
“...invalid meaning of of jihad is widespread among certain Muslim
leaders. For this group, jihad is interpreted as war or acts of violence.
This phenomenon is a clear abuse for the meaning of jihad. The me-
dia played a role in spreading understanding wrong by not preaching
the thoughts that oppose jihad meaning synonymous with violence or
war. In fact, the concept of jihad in the Quran and Hadith has noth-
ing to do with violence. The Quran does allow violence or war in
certain situations that cannot be avoided or in self-defense. In al-Hajj
(22): 39; which means: permission is given (to fight) for those who
fight because they have been wronged. Indeed, Allah Almighty will
help them. Indeed, a number of violent incidents have occurred in
the history of Islam. But it happens because there are private interests
(vested interest) by manipulating the verses of the Koran. Please also
specific answers that have social moral purpose of a general nature, which can be extracted
from certain verses in the light of the historical background is also often expressed by the
verse itself. See Fazlur Rahman, Islamic Methodology in History, Delhi: Adam Publishers and
Distributors, 1994. See Also Abdullah Saeed, The Koran: an Introduction, London: Roudledge,
2008, 219-231.Top of Form.
51Azyumardi Azra, Pergolakan Politik Islam: dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme hingga Post-
Modernisme, Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996, 110.
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note that in Islamic history of warfare between the Islamic groups is
much more prevalent than wars between Muslims and non-Muslims.
In the book Futuh al-Buldan disclosed some facts about the battle be-
tween Muslims and non-Muslims. Some historians hostile to Islam
view war against it in order to spread the teachings of Islam. Such
understanding is too simplistic interpretation of jihad. This understand-
ing is unfair towards Islam and towards history itself. Yet these wars
are more prevalent because of conquest and hegemony of certain po-
litical groups. Misunderstanding of the meaning of jihad also occurs in
groups Islamic Jihad at this time by way of misusing the interpretation
of the verses of the Quran”.52
It is obvious that the meaning of jihad should  be based on religious
values as substantive spirit of Islam which led to the formation of the
community who has the welfare and peace. On this aspect, there is a
need inform the proper meaning of jihad for thosewho adhere a reduc-
tive understanding of the jihad by entering the value of education as a
construct in Islamic religious education. One example is the radical Is-
lamic movement that had its own meaning to the different jihad with
moderate Muslims who tend to give meaning as “soft” as the concept of
“intellectual jihad” developed by Ziauddin Sardar. through this concept,
Sardar itends to provide an awareness that the meaning and scope of
jihad should not be reduced as a holy war as understood by radical Islamic
circles. With the return of meaning, jihad will still find context actualiza-
tion although not necessarily radically interpreted as holy war. In Indone-
sian context, the actualization of jihad according to a study conducted
Muhammad Chirzin activity could be commanding the good and forbid-
ding the evil in every room, especially the political, economic, and law.
Explained further:
52Dewan Redaksi, Keragaman Makna Jihad (Pengantar Redaksi), in  Harmoni Jurnal
Multikultral & Multireligius, Vol. VIII, No. 32 (OCtober-Desember 2009), 6-7.
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“Jihad is necessarily carried out in various forms are well-organized and
responsible by involving all the potential of the nation, without discern-
ment ethnic background, religion, race, and between groups, by inte-
grating the mission of the Islamic struggle in the Indonesian struggle is
... Jihad today at least agenda continue reforms in various spheres of
life. Both jihad in the socio-cultural, economic, political and legal, with
jihad like hell without compromise against corruption, collusion and
nepotism (KKN). Because it has been pointed out that the irregularities
in the various fields of life was not abated, even more rampant.”53
It can thus be concluded that the development agenda of Islamic reli-
gious education as part of the de-radicalization scheme needs to be ac-
companied by two serious efforts. Firstly, reinterpretation of the key con-
cepts in Islam is radically understood in more moderate and contextual
understanding by taking into account the conditions of Indonesia. Refer-
ring back to Umar’s recommendation on the urgency of re-interpreta-
tion of the key concepts in Islam (such asjihad, qital, apostasy, scribes, kafir
dhimmi, kafir harbi, darus salam, and darul harbi), there are questions relat-
ing to the contextualization and relevance of these concepts to the condi-
tions of Indonesia. Indonesia is not a religious state, or not an Islamic
country, in a narrower sense! Therefore, the mere application of these
concepts could create problems. The concept of kafir dhimmi is an ex-
ample. According to Nazaruddin Umar, kafir dhimmi is a category based
on principles of political jurisprudence (fiqh siyasah) which recognize two
categories of kafir dhimmi (non-Muslims involved in hostilities with the
Muslims) and kafir mu’ahad (non-Muslims committed by the Muslims for
not mutually hostile).
As Indonesia is not an Islamic state in its formal sense, non-Muslim or
Indonesian citizens who are not Muslim cannot be categorized as kafir
53Muhammad Chirzin, Kontroversi Jihad di Indonesia: Modernis vs Fundamentalis,
Yogyakarta: Kelompok Pilar, 2006, 282.
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dhimmi who are attached to the obligation to pay tribute as a form of
loyalty to the Islamic government.54 All Indonesian citizens assume the
same position regardless their religious background. All people of reli-
gion in Indonesia can actualize themselves based on the concept of the
political arena as the principle of democratic citizenship (citizenship as a
political principle of democracy). This concept is understood as an indi-
vidual citizen who has the right to be actively involved in public life, par-
ticipate in decision making as well as the main one, to fight for the pri-
macy (common good) as a common framework.55
Secondly, disseminating the results through a moderate interpreta-
tion of religious educational activity which promot certain values.
Umar’sassertion that Islam a religion of grace (ahmatan lil Alamin), tol-
erance, respect for human rights, and emancipatory is basically an affir-
mation that in Islamicvalues are not contradictory to universal,perennial,
and spiritual values which are absolute and do not change over time.56
Towards Islamic education based LVE
At practical level, the implementation of Islamic religious education is
still needs to be closer to the frame of view. Because so far run formalistic
religious education, activities merely to fulfill the will of the constitution
indeed requires that Islamic religious education as a matter that must be
given at all levels of education in formal education. In addition, Islamic
religious education was also criticized because it still insists on studies that
are too normative, less illustration of the socio-cultural context, and less
directed to how to change the religious knowledge that cognitive “mean-
ing” and “values” that need to be internalized within the participant learn-
54 Nasaruddin Umar, Deradikalisasi Pemahaman…, 200-231.
55Robertus Robet dan Hendrik Boli Tobi, Pengantar Sosiologi Kewarganegaraan dari
Marx sampai Agamben, Jakarta: Marjin Kiri, 2014, 4.
56Brahma Kumaris Educational Society, Education in Values and Spirituality…33.
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ers;57 or the education system is still struggling -which by Mohammed
Abed al-Jabri, Moroccan thinker said as bayani epistemology, or in the lan-
guage of M. Amin Abdullah called hadara al-nass (the religious culture
that merely refers to the text), where he only wrestled with a stack of
religious texts are mostly talking about the issues of fiqh alone.58 More
basic criticism leveled by Haidar Bagir assessing religious education, in-
cluding Islamic religious education have failed in forming a moral hu-
man beings.59Though education is the “heart” and “backbone” of the
future of the nation60 as well as the key to any effort to solve global prob-
lems61 and also one of the maturation processes of the quality of human
life.62 To be more illustrative and empirical, jihad can be used as an ex-
ample again. In textbooks and in the learning process of Islamic religious
education narrative of jihad is usually associated with a history of warfare
in Islam since the time of the Prophet. Certainly the way the narrative of
this kind is not entirely wrong because the war in Islam is one indisput-
able. However, referring back to Haidar Bagir, the narrative portion of
the battle is too big as the whole life of the Prophet is only traversed by
the war. In fact, continued Haidar Bagir, the life of the Prophet in a span
of approximately 23 years, equivalent to approximately 8000 days, the
57Muhaimin, dkk., Paradigma Pendidikan Islam: Upaya Mengefektifkan Pendidikan Agama
Islam di Sekolah, Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2001, 111.
58Sri Minarti, Ilmu Pendidikan Islam: Fakta Teoritis-Normatif & Aplikatif-Normatif, Jakarta:
Amzah, 2013, 8.
59Muhaimin Azzet, Urgensi Pendidikan Karakter di Indonesia, Yogyakarta: Ar -Ruzz Me-
dia, 2011, 9.
60Zian Farodis, Panduan Manajemen Pendidikan ala Harvard University, Yogyakarta: Diva
Press, 2011, 7. Thus, the success of an action is determined by its success in improving and
updating the education sector. Reza Aulia Bastian Refornasi Pendidikan: Langkah-langkah
Pembaharuan dan Pemberdayaan Pendidikan dalam Rangka Desentralisasi Sistem Pendidikan
Indonesia, Yogyakarta: Lapera Pustaka Utama, 2002, 24.
61Rutger Van Santen, dkk., 2030: Teknologi yang Akan Mengubah Dunia, Peterj.: Rahmani
Astuti, Solo: Metagraf, 2012, 282.
62Dedy Mulyasana, Pendidikan Bermutu dan Berdaya Saing, Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya,
2011, 2.
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percentage of time spent by the Prophet to fight only 10%, or the equiva-
lent of 800 days. In fact, according to the results of other studies cited by
Haidar Bagir, refer to a smaller percentage is only 1%, equivalent to 1%.
The question is, time outside the 10% or even 1%, it is used for what the
Prophet? Haidar Baqir deliberately asking such questions with the inten-
tion of looking for a foundation the argument that Islamic religious edu-
cation can counteract radicalism, but at the same time can be a source
which spawned radicalism when jihad is narrated through the war only
with the portion of excess, especially when coupled with a history of war
in the time of Caliph four and government post-Islamic caliphate.63
Starting fromthe opening of the education framework of Islam associ-
ated with the scheme of de-radicalization,on the one hand, and the criti-
cism of Islamic religious education on the other, at this point I will put an
emphasis on the importance of developing Islamic-based Living Values
Education (LVE). LVE is an operational elaboration of the principles of
education formulated by UNESCO, the UN agency for education.
UNESCO formulates four principles of education, namely: learning to
do, learning to know, learning to live together, and learning to be the
true self (be coming, to be). At issue, how can we implement this principle
in the fourth educational praxis. In 1996, about 20 teachers from around
the world gathered at UNICEF headquarters in New York to discuss how
to teach values. The meeting succeeded in formulating educational con-
cept known values Living Values: An Educational Program (LVEP), which
emphasizes the values of living methods in teaching values. By dropping
the LVE as a reference for the development of Islamic education, the im-
plication for developing Islamic religious education is primarily an educa-
tional value. In practice, LVE requires several steps as described below.
63http://haidar.baqir.com/pendidikan-agama-islam-dan radikalisme-paham-
keagamaan-di-indonesia/
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Picture 1. The stages of LVE
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LVE stages begin with a stimulus values through the activity of reflec-
tion, exploration of values in the real world, and receive information
through stories and literature. The results of these activities will be fur-
ther discussed with the aim of exploring ideas. Through this exploration
three ways can be developednamely creativity; skills development that
consists of emotional and interpersonal communication skills; and sensi-
tivity to the world community and the global environment. LVE stages
ended in an effort to integrate learning into the values of life. The values
emphasized in LVE frame consists of twelve values: peace, respect, love,
tolerance, honesty, humility, cooperation, happiness, responsibility, sim-
plicity, freedom, and unity. Explanation of each of the values   as pre-
sented in the table below.
Table1. Description of the twelve values in LVE64
64http://www.livingvaluesnet/reference/excellence.html.
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As the scheme shows, LVE is aimed at avoiding too verbal approach.
In this appriach, the success of educational process is only seen in the
ability of learners to recall certain values. Therefore, LVE is not “educa-
tional value” in the strict sense, but it is “living values   education”. If it is
grasped in only a narrow sense, the actual value of character education in
Indonesia is much more detailed as it contains such values as: being reli-
gious, honest, tolerance, discipline, hard work, creative, independent,
democratic, curiosity, the spirit of nationalism, love homeland, appreci-
ate the achievements, friends/communicative, love peace, bookworm,
care for the environment, social care, and responsibility. The failure of
education in Indonesia in developing the nation’s character, according
to Haidar Bagir, among other things,is caused by the verbalistic nature of
values educated   formal in educational institutions. This model of educa-
tion also emphasizes memory of subjects rather than its implementation.
IJIMS, Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 6, Number 1, June  2016: 93-126
122
The problem is, in the context of character education in Indonesia,
students, are only encouraged to learn and memorize thesevalues. Con-
sequently, the value of education in the strict sense which put greater
emphasis on practical values are not achieved. Because more emphasis
on caught, LVE considers it important creation of value-based environ-
ment that is more effective in shaping the personality of a person. This
environment can be habit people in educational institutions (teachers/
lecturers, managers, administrative staff, student/student) in social inter-
action, or the environment in terms of the physical form of the availabil-
ity of facilities and infrastructure are not only adequate but also looks
neat and clean. In the process of the formation of personality, values-
based environment is much more effective than verbal activity in the
classroom. Environment is called the hidden curriculum ever initiated by
Philip W. Jackson since the 1960s.65 Simply put, the hidden curriculum is
not a collection of thoughts in writing is written in textbooks or other
written sources, but a habituation, namely habituation-conditioning to
behave in accordance with the values   referenced.
Concluding remarks
By using LVE as a theoretical basis for the development of the Islamic
religious education, Islamic religious education should be understood as
an educational praxis value. In this context, LVE serves as a good perspec-
tive to determine both the substance and the process of, including how
the values   are ultimately forming a person’s character. As definition of
value suggests, value is a belief which motivates people’s action on the
basis of his choice.66 In other words, value is also understood as a  norma-
65Rakhmat Hidayat, Pengantar Sosiologi Kurikulum, Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2011, 73-74.
66Definisi Gordon Alport sebagaimana diukutip Rohmat Mulyana dalam,
Mengartikulasikan Pendidikan Nilai, Bandung: Alfabeta, 2004, 9.
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tive standard in determining a course of action,67including one’s interac-
tion with people of diverse background. It is the culmination of a series
of stages of LVE. If all values in the context of LVE are successfully inte-
grated in the life of religious, inter-religious life, it theoretically can be an
alternative way of setting the distance from the practice of intolerance,
conflict and violence.. With reference to normative on universal values
such as those developed in the LVE, an identity and symbolic-oriented
perspective and will be transformed into a broader perspective which
transcend beyond any identities. The twelve values introduced by LVE is
primarily a virtue  that can lead one to treat others as others treat to
him.Or in other words, somebody will not treat others as others do not
want to treat him the same thing.68 This is called the “golden rule”  which,
if adhered to and implemented in a consistent and sincere, life among
religious believers can be established in the bonds of compassion or com-
passionate, or borrowing Karen Armstrong’s word, mutual respect, mu-
tual tolerance, avoid coercion, willing to work together, not arrogant or
humble, promoting unity. In turn inter-religious life is always in a state of
peace.
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